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The United States is embarked upon an ambitious program of
western hemispheric economic integration about which its domestic
body politic is decidedly ambivalent. The process in which the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was approved in 1993 re-
vealed deep divisions between the major political parties and their
various interest group constituencies concerning the appropriate
scope of an economic integration agenda. The Mexican peso crisis
that began in December 1994 provoked a deep crisis of confidence
regarding Mexico's readiness to participate in a mature economic
partnership with the United States and Canada. Subsequent revela-
tions relating to corruption infecting the administration of former
President Salinas deepened these concerns. As implementation of the
NAFTA proceeded, pressures from within the Congress and the 1996
presidential election campaign put on hold negotiations concerning
accession of Chile to the NAFTA.
Beyond the NAFTA, the United States is involved in a very large
scale economic integration negotiation involving the entire western
hemisphere, save Cuba. The Summit of the Americas Declaration of
Principles of December 1994 envisions the completion of negotiation
of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) "no later than 2005 ...
with concrete progress toward the attainment of this objective.., by
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the end of this century."1 A series of ministerial meetings subsequent
to the initial Summit of the Americas has led to the establishment of
an array of inter-governmental working groups undertaking to concre-
tize the FTAA vision, as well as to the initiation of an active research
program at the Organization of American States (OAS), among other
regional organizations, designed ultimately to flesh out a blueprint for
the FTAA.
2
The creation of the NAFTA and the negotiation of the FTAA are
profoundly important political and economic developments for the
United States, just as the creation of the European Economic Com-
munity and the widening of the European Union are profoundly im-
portant political and economic developments on the other side of the
Atlantic. Yet the logic of the western hemispheric integration process
is not the logic of the European integration process. The historical
situation of Europe is extraordinarily complex. Interstate violence
played a central role in the creation and evolution of the European
Union. The need for rapid post-World War II economic rebuilding of
European industry and agriculture overshadowed purely national con-
cerns and helped to overcome historical rivalries among the Member
States and their citizens. The postwar threat of the Soviet empire pro-
vided a basis for Western European political cohesion that, in retro-
spect, may have been only dimly understood. Though the European
Union is now struggling to find direction, there remains strong con-
sensus that the core function of the Union in preserving European
peace and security should remain intact.4
If there is a logic to the western hemispheric integration process,
it is a different logic than the logic of Europe. Interstate violence has
played a very limited historical role among the nations of the western
1 Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action [Dec. 11, 1994], 34
I.L.M. 808, Declaration of Principles at 811 (1995).
2 See Joint Declaration of Western Hemisphere Trade Ministers, Summit of the Americas
Trade Ministerial, 12 INT'L TR. REPtR. (BNA) 1166 (July 5, 1995) and Final Cartegena Trade
Ministerial Declaration on FTAA, Summit of the Americas Second Ministerial Trade Meeting,
Cartegena, Colombia, Mar. 21, 1996, Joint Declaration, INsmE NAFTA, Mar. 25, 1996, at 7.
3 See George Soros, Can Europe Work?, 75 FoRnIN A . 8 (1996) (reflecting on the de-
gree to which the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 fundamentally changed the political dynamic of
Europe).
4 See European Council Reflection Group's Report, Messina 2nd June 1995, Brussels, Dec.
5 1995 12 ("The Group emphasizes that this guarantee of prosperity and peace is not perpetual
and that it would be a grave error to underestimate the Community's main contribution to the
Member States and their citizens, namely a shared view of life that has ruled out war as a means
of settling differences .... ."). The Reflection Group was established by the European Council
and directed to prepare a report identifying issues to be addressed at the 1996 Intergovernmen-
tal Conference. Id.
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hemisphere. Internal strife, on the other hand, has plagued many na-
tions of Latin America. Low rates of economic growth throughout the
four decades following the Second World War worked great economic
and social hardship. The promise of more rapid economic growth im-
pelled a recent change in government attitudes towards trade and in-
vestment and paved the way for the FTAA negotiations.
The first draft of this article was prepared in early 1995 immedi-
ately following the Mexican peso crisis and was presented as part of a
lecture series at U.C. Berkeley School of Law. The thesis of that draft
was (1) that there was a net positive social welfare value to the
NAFTA; (2) that there was a lack of political support for a socially
progressive NAFA in the United States that gave rise to doubts con-
cerning its viability; and (3) that analytical tools developed by political
and social scientists might assist public policy planners in the United
States to address the underlying lack of support that threatened the
NAFTA enterprise. Over the past two years the immediacy of the
peso crisis has faded. The NAFTA increasingly appears as a compo-
nent of a broader long-term hemispheric picture that is slowly coming
into focus. For this reason, the focus of the article has changed.
This article is now directed to the steps that should be taken to
build a foundation for the longer-term enterprise of western hemi-
spheric integration. The article begins by reviewing the work of polit-
ical and social scientists who have stressed that international and
regional institution-building require the self-interest and support of
key actors and interest groups involved in the process. The success of
a regional integration effort may well depend on the presence of a
sufficient confluence of self-interests among key actors and interest
groups throughout economically-important countries in a region. This
article concentrates as a starting point on United States interest
groups and political actors and considers whether these key actors and
interest groups have a self-interest in the success of hemispheric inte-
gration. It suggests some ways that domestic support for the future
western hemispheric integration process may be enhanced.
Ultimately, the process of building the FTAA will not be success-
ful simply because it is supported in the United States, even though it
will certainly fail from a lack of U.S. support. The building of a re-
gional integration arrangement requires support from throughout a
region. There remains ahead the very large task of identifying the key
actors and interest groups throughout the nations of the prospective
FTAA and their self-interests in the integration process.
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Western hemispheric economic integration can be undertaken in
a socially responsible manner that will result in a net positive social
welfare value for the people of the United States and the western
hemisphere as a whole.5 The essential questions that must be ad-
dressed in the process of institution building concern the shape of the
process: who will benefit and what will be its impact on the overall
quality of life in the region? It certainly is not enough that a regional
integration arrangement be built; an arrangement that promotes the
social welfare interests of the people of this hemisphere must be built.
I. ANALYTIC TooLs
A. Neo-Functionalism
1. Development and Critique
In The Uniting of Europe, published in 1958, Ernst Haas ana-
lyzed the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) of 1951/52, the predecessor to the European Economic Com-
munity of 1957/58.6 Haas concluded that the successful formation of
the ECSC was based on a confluence of self-interests among Euro-
pean elite groups-most notably national political leaders, industry
leaders and labor union leaders. This confluence of self-interests re-
sulted in a willingness to forego narrow national advantages in favor
of broader community advantages and in the cession of decision-mak-
ing authority to regional institutions. Haas postulated that the conflu-
ence of elite self-interests drives the regional integration process.
Moreover, he said, if a confluence of self-interests drives the integra-
tion process, then the integration process is likely to proceed by a se-
ries of incremental steps, rather than by a leap into a fully formed
structure founded upon a political ideal.
Haas suggested that the formation of collective institutions at the
regional level and the incremental process of decision-making leads
to important "spillover" effects. As the process of collective decision-
making proceeds, institutions extend the scope of their action. Thus,
for example, institutions that were initially designed to address reduc-
tions in tariffs are concerned with the harmonization of company law
5 The draft of this article presented at Berkeley and distributed to participants in this ASIL
IELIG conference contained a detailed analysis of the underlying value of regional integration
in the NAFTA context. In the interests of brevity, this version refers instead to the excellent
analysis of the economic and social welfare value of the NAFTA in Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Good for Jobs, for the Environment, and for
America, 23 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 461 (1993).
6 ERNST B. HAAs, THE UNrING OF EUROPE (1958).
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and control of the business cycle.7 Spillovers are of considerable im-
portance in accelerating and deepening the integration process be-
cause they do not entail significant political decisions at the
subregional level (which may be contentious). Haas observed that the
spillover phenomenon was largely confined to regional arrangements
that include collective decision-making institutions (as with the Euro-
pean Union), and did not appear to operate significantly in respect to
free trade areas. 8 Haas' insights into the regional integration process
are referred to as "neo-functional" theory.9
Haas was not content to rest on his initial theorizing. He became
his most important critic. The emergence of General Charles de
Gaulle in France as a powerful opponent of the European integration
process, based in French nationalism, led Haas to suggest that he may
have seriously underestimated the capacity of a single charismatic
political leader to interfere with the integration process.10 Haas later
concluded that he and his neo-functional school colleagues may have
failed to anticipate the "turbulent" nature of society." He suggested
that the ever-changing nature of human affairs makes it exceedingly
difficult for elites to identify their self-interests, to evaluate how their
self-interests may be maximized through the pursuit of alternative
political strategies, and, therefore, to agree on the pursuit of regional
objectives. Moreover, he suggested that regional integration mecha-
nisms cannot be fully evaluated, and understood as self-contained sys-
tems. The constituent countries of the regional integration
arrangement (RIA) interact with a broader global community. The
interests of third countries may not be consistent with that of the RIA,
and the individual constituent countries of the RIA may find a greater
confluence of interests with third countries, certainly in some cases,
7 See Ernst B. Haas, The Study of Regional Integration. Reflections on the Joy and Anguish
of Pretheorizing, 24 INr'L ORG. 607, 617 (1970).
8 Id. See LAURA D'ANDRA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CoNFLIcr IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY INDuSTRIES 32 (1992) (discussing "spillovers" in the economic context).
9 "Neo" is used in this context because Haas built on earlier theorizing that regional inte-
gration proceeded because of the "functional" requirements of its participants, for example, the
requirement to integrate markets to promote economic efficiencies. Haas more deeply examined
the social and political factors, the elite self-interests, which he concluded drove the integration
process, and attempted to identify a route by which integration was more likely successfully to
proceed.
10 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America, 5 J. COMM. MKT.
STUD. 315 (1967).




than they find with their regional integration partners.' 2 This lead
Haas to suggest that integration should be studied and understood as
a broad global phenomenon, and should not be confined to the re-
gional unit.
The progression of Haas' thinking is very important. There is a
growing awareness that the global economy involves at its outer edge
a single large-scale integration system and that the actions and reac-
tions of each actor create effects throughout the system. This progres-
sion points to the importance of considering the relationship of
regional systems such as the European Union and NAFTA within the
larger World Trade Organization system.
From the perspective of value-orientation, Haas appears princi-
pally concerned with whether and to what extent regional integration
arrangements will enhance global public order.' 3 His inquiry also ex-
tends to "whether regional common markets are really better for in-
dustrialization and effective welfare policies than is a global division
of labor, whether they lead to redistribution and the equitable sharing
of scarce resources - or to more competition for such spoils."' 4 His
work on regional integration identifies the variables at work in the
integration process, attempts to explain the phenomenon, and is con-
cerned with identifying or developing predictive tools.
2. The Realpolitik of Neo-Functionalism
The neo-functionalist approach to the study of regional integra-
tion demands a close attention to the social forces at work throughout
a region. Integration planners and analysts in the United States have
access to a great deal of information concerning the social structure
and economic forces at work in this country and should be able to
identify the interests of the various groups with a significant stake in,
and influence over, the integration process. There is, however, a con-
siderable gap in the United States between the level of understanding
of the domestic/local socio-economic process and the level of under-
standing of the socio-economic processes in other countries (and
12 See Frederick M. Abbott, Crosscurrents in European Union External Commercial Rela-
tions: The Controversy over the Germany-United States Treaty of Friendship, 54 ZAORV 756
(1994) (illustrating the difficulties arising when national and regional interests diverge with re-
spect to third countries).
13 See, ag., Haas, The Study of Regional Integration, supra note 7, at 608. Haas stresses the
importance to the political scientist of maintaining a neutral observational standpoint. His early
work appears to be principally concerned with identifying the variables that influence the re-
gional integration process. See HAAs, supra note 6, at 3-11.
14 Haas, supra note 7, at 608.
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parts) of the hemisphere. Explaining the NAFTA in satisfactory neo-
functional terms requires an analysis of how the political systems of
Canada and Mexico operate: who are the political actors and what
interests do they represent? The neo-functional approach requires an
analysis of the economic system of Mexico: who are the owners of
Mexican industry, what goals are they seeking, and how do they plan
to achieve them? A satisfactory neo-functional analysis must identify
other important interest groups and leaders. Who are the leaders of
the labor unions? What goals are they trying to promote? How do
they evaluate the potential impact of regional integration on their
interests?
The interests of the managers of large businesses in the United
States and Mexico with respect to the removal of barriers to trade and
investment may be quite different. A U.S. manager may see the re-
moval of a Mexican trade barrier as a benign business opportunity
that will allow his or her business to expand its operation south of the
U.S. border, thereby increasing profits and job security. The Mexican
manager may see the removal of the same barrier in opposite terms,
i.e., as creating a threat to his or her job by encouraging the appear-
ance of an efficient competitor.
Labor union leaders in the United States and Mexico may have
dissimilar interests in the regional interest process. The NAFTA may
be more likely to raise wages in Mexico than in the United States. This
might appear to provide the basis for support of labor union leaders in
Mexico. But Mexican labor unions may be dominated by large polit-
ical parties, and the leaders of these unions may be threatened by the
transparency that the NAFTA promises to create. These union leaders
may prefer an entrenched system in which they operate together with
political leaders outside public scrutiny.
Mexico's socio-economic system may be extremely difficult, for
U.S. planners at least, to analyze. Former President Carlos Salinas was
hailed by the United States and in-the international community as a
progressive visionary opening up the Mexican economy to foreign
trade, investment and competition. He spearheaded an ambitious
privatization program. Yet during the President's term in office, his
brother was accumulating a fortune through suspect dealings with
Mexican business leaders, and associates of the President accumulated
vast wealth as the privatization program proceeded.
It is apparent that an identification and analysis of actors and in-
terests in the FTAA context would be a far more difficult and complex
task than an identification and analysis in the isolated NAFTA con-
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text. Who are the political leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Peru and Venezuela? What is their power base? Who are the owners
of industry? What might their goals be in an economic integration
process involving the United States? Are the labor pools organized?
What are the structures of the unions? Are they allied to political par-
ties? What are the interests and goals of the union leaders?
3. Neo-Functional Tools
As a political scientist, Ernst Haas sought to develop a set of tools
which would permit a robust prediction of the success of a regional
integration arrangement. Haas criticized his neo-fanctional theory as a
tool of prediction on the grounds of complexity. Regional integration
arrangements are an interconnected part of a global political-eco-
nomic-social system. The interests of actors and groups extend outside
of the regional arrangement, and interests outside the RIA will impact
its development in ways that cannot be predicted by studying the
forces inside the RIA alone. Moreover, individual charismatic leaders
may be able to alter, or at least temporarily stall, the regional integra-
tion process with a personal agenda that swims against an otherwise
"neo-functionally adequate" confluence of interests.
It is doubtless important to keep in mind the limitations of neo-
functional theory. It may not permit a robust prediction of the success
or failure of an RIA based on a confluence of elite interests. Yet
whether or not neo-functional theory permits extrapolation of the fu-
ture, there is nevertheless important insight in Haas' work. The
chances for an RIA's success should be substantially greater if impor-
tant decision-makers in a region share interests and objectives. If inte-
gration planners identify the common interests of key decision-makers
in the planning phase of an RIA, they may be able to design the inte-
gration structure in a way that will minimize conflict during the RIA
approval and implementation phases. Conversely, a failure by integra-
tion planners to recognize the presence of competing interests among
disparate actors in the various nations of a region may substantially
undermine the RIA's prospects for success.
4. The Limits of the Elite
Haas focused on the role of elites in the formation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community and subsequent Latin American integra-
tion arrangements because he concluded that the leaders of
important interest group communities were able to steer the direction
of government and industry. The development of the mass media over
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the past several decades may have altered, at least somewhat, the rela-
tionship between the elite and the common individual. In making and
implementing policy, political leaders in the United States have be-
come highly dependent on polling and the reaction of the general pub-
lic to policy proposals. While leaders in the mass media may play a
significant role in shaping public opinion, it is becoming increasingly
clear that in an open society political leaders cannot make and pursue
policies that are contrary to views and values widely held by the public
at large. For example, the Republicans who captured control of Con-
gress in 1994 discovered that the vast majority of U.S. citizens value
environmental protection. Adverse public reaction to the Republican
agenda to eliminate environmental programs not only precluded the
implementation of the agenda, but apparently led to a significant un-
dermining of the role of the congressional Republican leadership.
This is not to suggest that elites have ceased to play the key role
in formulating and implementing policy. The public at large is unlikely
to formulate new policy initiatives in the field of international trade.
On the other hand, it seems apparent that the influence of the public
at large on government decision-making, largely as the result of tech-
nological advances in the information industries, has increased since
the late 1950s when the EEC was created. The recent European expe-
rience with the Maastricht Treaty approval process demonstrates that
the failure of political leaders to appreciate and address underlying
popular sentiments may lead to important roadblocks in the process
of regional integration.
B. Regional Integration as Social Process
The neo-functional school of political science can be productively
integrated with the contextual social science approach to the problems
of society, politics and human development suggested by Harold Lass-
well. There is a high degree of complementarity in the two approaches
to society and its development.' 5
Like Haas, Lasswell and his collaborators focused on the power
of ruling elites to influence the course of social development. 16 Simi-
15 Haas on occasion refers to Lasswell in footnotes, while reserving most social science refer-
ence to Karl Deutsch and communicatinns theory. Lasswell likewise refers to Deutsch. This au-
thor is not aware of reference by Lasswell to Haas, but the work of both scholars is extensive,
and no detailed study has been made to determine whether any cross-references exist.
16 Starting with HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURrY
(1935), Laswell sought to demystify the world political process by identifying and analyzing the
deep psychological, symbolic, cultural and economic factors that underlie and motivate social
behaviors. Lasswell, both alone and in collaboration with others, later developed highly detailed
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larly, Lasswell observed that elite groups would seek to pursue their
self-interests - which he referred to as value accumulation - and
would not be likely to act in ways that would undermine their status
(in its broad sense). Lasswell identified the tools by which elite groups
seek to achieve their aims-for example, by the granting and depriva-
tion of material benefits, and by the manipulation of symbols of iden-
tification (e.g., symbols of nationalism), in addition, of course, to
employing instruments of violence.
Two divergent - though not inconsistent - features of Haas'
and Lasswell's work may be identified. Lasswell, more than Haas, fo-
cused on the importance of the common individual (or rank and file)
in the social process. Lasswell stressed that the elite are dependent on
the acceptance of their dominant role by the rank and file. To put it
plainly, the rank and file, in discontent, have the power to threaten the
status of the elite. As a second divergent feature, Lasswell's work is
more explicitly directed to establishing goal- or value-orientations.
17
Haas principally identifies public order concerns, and secondarily de-
velopmental interests. Having focused on the European integration
process, Haas may well have viewed the underlying social welfare
value of regional integration as self-evident.' Lasswell's work focused
on the importance of the dignity of the individual, of freedom of per-
sonal development and expression, and of distributing the benefits of
development widely. Lasswell accepted that society must improve it-
self through conscious public choice. Improvements in social welfare
may not automatically flow from economic development. Institutions
must be designed so as to promote the attainment of preferred values.
The insights of Ernst Haas and Harold Lasswell provide impor-
tant tools to assist in enhancing the prospects for successful implemen-
tation of regional integration arrangements such as the NAFTA and
contextual maps of the structure and behavior of human societies. See, eg., HAROLD D. LASS-
wELL, PoLrncs: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1936); HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLI-
TICS FACES ECONOMIcs (1945); HAROLD D. LASSWELL AND ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND
SOCIETY:. A FRAMEWORK OF POLrTCAL INoUIRY (1950); and, Harold D. Lassell and Allan R.
Holmberg, Toward a General Theory of Directed Value Accumulation and Institutional Develop-
ment, in COmPAA Trw THroRIEs OF SOCIAL CHANGE (Hollis W. Peter ed., 1966). Lasswell's
principal collaborator in the development of the contextual school of legal analysis was, of
course, Myres McDougal. See generally, HAROLD D. LASSELL AND MRFS S. McDOUGAL, JU-
RISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCmTY (1992).
17 This is a major theme of the New Haven School of jurisprudence. See generally LAssWELL
AND McDOUGAL, supra note 16.
18 This is intimated in The Study of Regional Integration, where Haas, in discussing the rea-
sons for studying the regional integration process, concludes that "[a]ll this should be self-evi-
dent. But it has been hidden by the concern of some students of integration for the canons of
social science and its language." Haas, supra note 7, at 608.
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FTAA and in maximizing their benefits to society as a whole. The
neo-functionalists stress the importance of identifying the actors, in-
cluding groups, who drive the integration process and who also may
stall it. In order to stimulate the integration process, the interests of
the various key actors may be identified, and that information may be
used to frame institutional structures that will productively channel
those interests. The neo-functionalists and social scientists suggest to
us the importance of coalition- and consensus-building. They intimate
that the proposal of "better ideas" from a social welfare perspective
may be futile, if these ideas are not adequately grounded in the inter-
ests of important actors in the regional integration process.
II. U.S. INTEREST GROUPS
19
A. The Business Community
Among U.S. interest groups, the business community plays the
most significant role in the formulation and implementation of trade
policy. The business community exercises its influence through the
lobbying activities of various well-known associations such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers,
the National Foreign Trade Council, and the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers Association. Individual firms exercise their influ-
ence through-lobbying activities and the contribution of funds to polit-
ical campaigns. Lawyers and other consultants with expertise in the
formulation and implementation of trade-related legislation play an
active role on behalf of the business community by, inter alia, closely
tracking legislative proposals and assisting in commenting on such
proposals as they proceed through the legislative process.
The business community has far more capital to invest in policy-
influencing activities than other U.S. interest groups. This significantly
advantages the business community in the political process. The busi-
ness community has a large and direct stake in the outcome of deci-
sions on trade policy, and the success of U.S. business directly affects
the income and standard of living of U.S. citizens. There is sound rea-
son for the business community to be concerned with the formulation
19 According to Lasswell and Kaplan, "[a]n interest group is an interest aggregate organized
for the satisfaction of the interest.... All groups might be regarded as interest groups, since they
all involve demands (preferences if not determinations) and expectations. But we may
distinguish among various patterns of group activity those concerned with the satisfaction of
interests-rather than, say, propagation of faiths or evocation of loyalties-and characterize the
group as an interest group with regard to these patterns." LASSWELL AND KAPLAN, supra note
16, at 40 (italics in original).
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and implementation of trade policy, and there is sound reason for the
federal government to take into account the interests of the business
community in trade policy formulation and implementation.
In one of the most insightful papers on the future of international
trade policy to have appeared in recent years, Gary Hufbauer
observes:
This robust outlook for trade in goods and services does not depend
on whether the WTO or regional groups predominate in setting the com-
mercial agenda. Rather it depends on the conjunction of opportunities
for profitable trade and the underlying political arithmetic of removing
barriers.
In my political arithmetic, firms are the decisive political unit, and
they can be divided into three groups. When I classify a firm in one of
the three groups, I am referring to all its stakeholders - shareholders,
creditors, managers, employees, and local communities. Differences can
arise between the various stakeholders, but they usually adopt a com-
mon line towards international commercial questions.
Firms in the first group oppose import liberalization because they
will face lower prices and lose market share, with few offsetting gains.
USX and Burlington Industries come to mind. In a crude way, these
firms understand economics, and they know they operate at a competi-
tive disadvantage.
Firms in the second group support liberalization because they can
get cheaper and better quality inputs. Large retailers such as Sears and
Walmart, and many U.S. electronics firms are in this category.
Firms in the third group endorse liberalization as a means of achiev-
ing better access to foreign markets, enabling them to increase sales vol-
ume and spread overhead costs. Microsoft, Disney and Boeing belong to
this group.2°
The NAFTA, as an international commercial proposition, prom-
ised clear benefits to the second and third category of firms identified
by Hufbauer. NAFTA was principally directed at removing Mexico's
barriers to imports and inward direct investment.2 ' There would be
steep reductions in the Mexican tariffs paid by U.S. exporters, and a
broad range of Mexican quotas would be eliminated. Reductions in
U.S. trade and investment barriers would be minimal since U.S. tariffs
and quotas were not significant impediments to imports from Mexico.
Much of Mexico's consumer export trade to the United States was
already conducted under the Maquiladora program. Successful large-
20 Gary Hufbauer, The WTO and Regional Groups: Rules of Coexistence, paper presented
at The Multilateral Trade Regime in the 21st Century, Columbia University, 316-17 (Nov. 4-5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
21 See generally, FREDERICK M. ABBOTr, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
THE NAFTA A WEsTEmR HEMISPHmEC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZA-
TIONAL SYs'mm 61-96 (1995).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:900 (1996-97)
scale U.S. retailers would benefit from low priced Mexican exports to
the U.S. market, even though some parts of the U.S. textile and agri-
cultural sectors would be adversely affected as U.S. barriers to imports
were eliminated. In addition, retailers such as Sears and Walmart were
in the process of establishing a significant direct investment presence
in Mexico. The investment rules of the NAFTA would benefit them.
United States exporters across a broad range of industries would
benefit from improved access to the Mexican market. Mexican ex-
ports would not be a threat to American high value-added manufac-
turers in the U.S. market. Mexican banks and insurance companies
posed no threat to the dominance of U.S. service providers in the
United States.
Of course, some firms (in Hufbauer's first category) would not
gain from the NAFTA. Losses could be anticipated in a few formerly
protected agricultural industries, such as the tomato and avocado in-
dustries, in the textiles manufacturing sector, and in a few other sec-
tors that had required significant trade barriers to protect them
against imports from Mexico. Some of these protected industries, such
as textiles, in any event stood to lose much of their protection as a
result of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations. 22 The prospective
losers from the NAFTA represented a very small proportion of U.S.
business.3 For most of the U.S. business community, the NAFrA was
a no-lose proposition, and the very strong support of the NAFTA by
this community is not difficult to explain.
1. A Critique of the Business Community Perspective on
the NAFTA
During fairly extensive interviewing of business officials in Japan,
I was frequently told that the Japanese viewed Mexico as a market
whose risks, for the time-being at least, appeared to outweigh its re-
wards.2 4 For example, Mexico lacks adequate infrastructure develop-
ment, a major deficiency that is not likely to be remedied with any
immediacy. Mexico is also politically unstable, and its regulatory sys-
22 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles ultimately required the phasing out of textile
quotas over a ten year period. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, WORLD TRADE ORGAN-
IZATION, Tim RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATONS 85
at, eg., art. 2 (1995).
23 See, e.g., U.S. International Trade Commission, The Likely Impact on the United States of a
Free Trade Agreement with Mexico, USITC Pub. No. 2353, Feb. 1991, and Potential Impact on the
U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North American Free-Trade Agreement, USITC Pub.
No. 2596, Jan. 1993.




tern is very difficult to navigate. Chile, it was observed, is a much bet-
ter candidate for investment, and the myriad of investment
opportunities in the developing countries of Asia further reduce Mex-
ico's relative appeal to the Japanese business community. The
NAFTA was more likely to result in an increase in Japanese invest-
ment in the southern States of the United States than in Mexico
proper.2 5
The American multinational business community did not ap-
proach the NAFrA with a plan to address the shortcomings identified
by the Japanese. The business community activity lobbied against
measures and institutional arrangements intended to protect and im-
prove the environment and to improve the conditions of labor. The
NAFTA all but ignored fiscal and monetary implications. The peso
crisis and the general level of political upheaval in Mexico during the
two years since the advent of the NAFTA may yet cause the Ameri-
can multinational business community to rethink the advantages of a
laissez faire approach to Mexico and other Latin American markets.
2. Changing the Business Community Perspective on the FTAA
The business community will not be convinced to undertake any
enterprise of significance unless it is convinced of the self-interest in-
herent in that enterprise. For the sake of argument, one can accept the
drive for greater profits as representing that self-interest. But the
American multinational business community reflects a diversity of in-
terests and perspectives even on the narrow question of the genera-
tion of profits. Industry characteristics vary widely, perspectives on
the desirability of short- versus long-term benefits differ, and differ-
ences in corporate culture reflect themselves in different perspectives
on the role of the corporation in the community. A thorough analysis
of the methods for influencing the behavior of the American multina-
tional business community would take into account all of these
factors.
However, almost all multinational businesses share at least some
basic perspectives that can be addressed in a general way. First, larger
scale business enterprises prefer political stability to instability, even
though a high-risk operator might be able to generate greater gains in
an unstable environment. The People's Republic of China is a prefera-
ble investment site to Russia because the former is more stable, even
25 Id. Lower-wage southern States with well-developed infrastructure would provide a
strong platform for exports to the Mexican market by capital intensive industries such as the
automotive industry. Id.
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if arguably more repressive. The history of Latin American invest-
ment patterns is replete with illustrations of U.S. multinational prefer-
ences for governmental stability. Second, wide fluctuations in
macroeconomic conditions are undesirable. This reflects a preference
for economic stability that. permits longer-term business planning.
Rapid changes in currency valuation are undesirable, even though
hedging mechanisms may offset risk to a certain extent. Third, infra-
structure development is necessary to conduct business effectively,
and should be paid for with public as opposed to private self-funding.
Fourth, efficient systems of governmental regulation are far preferable
to inefficient systems. Harmonized regulations improve the efficiency
of production and distribution. Governmental corruption and non-
transparency are likely to benefit inefficient local operators over effi-
cient multinational operators.
Of course, one can quibble over the details of each of the points
just made. But on the whole they lead to the following conclusion: it is
in the best interests of the American multinational business commu-
nity to seek to promote political stability in Mexico and elsewhere in
Latin America, to pursue stable fiscal and monetary policies in Mex-
ico, to encourage the development of public infrastructure, to en-
courage the approximation or harmonization of regulatory systems
among the FTAA countries, to oppose the corruption of government
regulators, and to increase the transparency of the FTAA/Latin
American regulatory system. None of these are short-term business
endeavors.
The business community must be careful not to equate political
stability and political oppression. Long-term political stability
throughout Latin America will come only from the gradual democrati-
zation of political institutions. Military rule has been tried throughout
much of Latin America, and it has resulted in instability, internal vio-
lence and slow economic growth.
Private business enterprises do not want to be responsible for fi-
nincing the construction of roadways, ports and airports. They do not
want to pay for the construction of massive farmland irrigation sys-
tems. These are all public enterprises that require thoughtful long-
term planning. Business enterprises want governments and the public
to pay for such endeavors. It was disingenuous for the American mul-
tinational business community to urge the restriction of the scope of
the NAFTA's goals and measures in the name of laissez faire eco-




intervention. They should play an important role in the government
planning process.
It is well known that the U.S. business community faces pressure
to focus on short term profitability because of the short term perspec-
tive often exhibited by the financial/investment markets. Foreign
direct investments, however, require a medium to long-term perspec-
tive. An automobile plant in Latin America will not return its capital
investment in five years. The hundreds of millions of dollars invested
will need to be recovered over a longer period. If capital investment is
to be successful, security and infrastructure are very important. The
pressure for short term results in the U.S. financial markets should not
obscure the cleai longer term interests of investors.
Though the commercial calculus of U.S. businesses with respect
to the FTAA will be more complex than the calculus with respect to
the NAFTA, it is reasonable to anticipate that the business community
will on the whole view the enterprise as representing an important
commercial opportunity. In the process of influencing the FTAA ne-
gotiations, the various industry associations that are responsible for
corporate lobbying in Washington should step back from the immedi-
ate goal of achieving a short term trade and investment vehicle - a
goal that was accomplished in the NAFTA - and focus on longer
term self-interests. The business interest in the FTAA should include
attention to institutional structures designed to improve infrastructure
planning and development, and the coordination of regulatory policies
(including harmonization of rules where appropriate). Insofar as rules
are applicable to all investors, whether local or foreign, U.S. investors
should not be disadvantaged from a more comprehensive FTAA
arrangement.
26
26 A business leader wants to assure that his or her cost structure is not undercut by a com-
petitor, such as a competitor who can avoid compliance with environmental regulation. If all
firms in a sector are subject to the same compliance costs, whether those costs are high or low,
competition within the relevant sector should be stable, except that firms which cannot adapt to
the regulatory environment (e.g., because it is too expensive) may be harmed. If Mexican envi-
ronmental regulation both required a high level of protection and was strictly enforced, U.S.-
based firms that have more capital, technology, and experience with compliance, may be more
successful that their Mexican competitors. Similarly, U.S.-based firms that offer higher levels of
employee benefits, including better working environments, might find it in their interests to see
similar standards applied in Mexico if this produced a competitive advantage over Mexican firms
in the same sector. The problem confronting the U.S. business community (which European
Union business must also face), is that it must compete not only with its NAFTA integration
partners (i.e., Canada and Mexico), but with Southeast Asia's business community, which will
not face similar regulatory compliance costs.
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B. Organized Labor
Over the past several decades labor unions have represented a
declining proportion of U.S. workers. In the early 1950s, over 30% of
U.S. workers in the non-agricultural labor force were members of a
labor union. By 1989, only 16.4% of U.S. workers were represented by
unions.2 7 Declines in union membership have particularly affected the
manufacturing sector, while the proportion of union membership
among government and service employees has generally remained
constant. 8 Just as with respect to the business community, the various
U.S. unions and their memberships reflect diverse interests. By 1988,
about 40% of unionized workers were white-collar workers.29 United
States services workers are not as vulnerable as U.S. manufacturing
workers to the loss of jobs to foreign workers. Services unions do not
face the same threat from foreign wage competition as do manufactur-
ing unions. Nevertheless, services unions have an indirect interest in
the maintenance of the U.S. industrial base that requires services
support.
1. The Unions and the NAFTA
United States labor unions vehemently opposed the NAFFA
from the outset.30 The inability of union leaders to alter the structure
of the NAFTA in the manner they advocated, and the clear failure of
the unions in decisively influencing the outcome of the approval vote,
demonstrated the present state of union influence over the U.S. polit-
ical process. Nevertheless, in a pluralistic democracy, the major polit-
ical parties cannot ignore the leadership and voice of 16 to 17 million
union members, even assuming that only half of the union members
(i.e., in the manufacturing sector) consider themselves to have a direct
stake in the trade policy agenda.
27 Gary N. Chaison and Joseph B. Rose, The Macrodeterminants of Union Growth and De-
cline, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 3-4 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991). In 1991, there were
some 16.6 million union members in the United States. Hoyt N. Wheeler, Industrial Relations in
the United States of America, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATvn INDUsTRAL RELATIONS
55, 66 (Greg. J. Bamber and Russell D. Lansbury eds., 2d ed., Routledge 1993) (1987).
28 Wheeler, supra note 27, at 66. While some services unions have experienced growth over
the past 15 years as the number of services workers has increased, id., the proportion of repre-
sentation in the services sector has declined from its high in 1970, but leveled off after 1983. See
WILLIAM FORM, SEGMENTED LABOR, FRAcrtmnn PoLrrcs 44 (1995).
29 Wheeler, supra note 27, at 67.
30 See, eg., FoRM, supra note 28, at 306.
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a. The Key Labor Issue
The root of the problem identified by U.S. labor leaders in the
NAFTA debate was the disparity in the conditions of labor in the
United States and Mexico.3' In the United States, workers are for the
most part relatively highly paid, enjoy a comfortable standard of liv-
ing, and expect a relatively high level of social support in the form of
insured medical assistance, as well as paid vacations or leaves from
work. Social services are provided in connection with the workplace,
or by the federal and State governments that recycle tax revenues into
social support programs. In Mexico, living standards are compara-
tively low and social services are likewise deficient.32 Faced with lim-
ited opportunities, workers accept low-wage employment with
restricted or non-existent medical and related benefits. Given these
factors, firms whose labor costs represent a significant factor of pro-
duction would be expected - all other things being equal - to locate
production facilities in Mexico rather than in the United States. While
all other things are not usually equal with respect to decisions con-
cerning the location of production facilities,33 U.S. labor unions none-
theless were legitimately concerned over the potential impact of the
NAFTA on the conditions of labor in the United States. The labor
community perceived that the NAFTA could be used both as a vehicle
31 See, ag., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, US-Mexico Trade: Pulling To-
gether or Pulling Apart? ITE-545 (1992) [hereinafter OTA Study].
32 See generally OTA Study, supra note 31 (providing detailed comparison of Mexican and
U.S. labor conditions).
33 Labor is a component of industrial and service production. It is one of many components
of production, and the relative importance of labor to production will of course vary widely
depending upon the characteristics of an industry. In labor-intensive industries such as textiles
and assembly-line based industries, labor costs will be a very significant production factor and
the acceptable skill level of labor may be very. low. In other industries labor costs may be very
low relative to the value of the final product such that the cost of labor is largely irrelevant, or
labor costs may be very high and require highly educated and trained individuals. For example,
in the automobile industry labor is a significant portion of the cost of production, but other
factors like plant and equipment costs and infrastructure requirements are also extremely impor-
tant. As a result, the cost of labor, though significant, is generally not the determinative factor in
the process by which automotive businesses chose where to locate production.
It is important to note that the relative significance of labor costs to production varies
widely in addressing the impact of liberal trade rules, such as those embodied in the NAFTA, on
social welfare. Though certainly some businesses will locate their production facilities in coun-
tries with the lowest wage rates in order to lower their production costs, that is by no means a
universal operating principal. In fact, one of the key factors in determining whether trade liberal-
izing agreements will result in shifts in production, and corresponding shifts in employment op-
portunity, is the proportion of labor costs to total production costs in the industries of parties to
the agreement.
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to move production facilities to Mexico, and as a bargaining lever by
employers in future wage and benefit negotiations.
The 1992 Office of Technology Assessment Study (OTA Study)
of the potential impact of the NAFTA34 provided the intellectual
foundation for the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion (NAALC) and included a detailed description and analysis of la-
bor conditions in the United States and Mexico. The NAALC and
related domestic labor legislation embody only a limited part of the
extensive domestic and continental agenda recommended by the OTA
Study. The Study advocated more extensive worker training and skills
certification programs in the United States, improvements in the U.S.
health care system designed to reduce disincentives to hiring, and
amendment of U.S. labor laws to encourage union representation. The
study also discouraged state and local "bidding wars" to recruit new
industries.35 On the regional level, the recommendations included a
trilateral Labor Commission to help negotiate minimum wage stan-
dards scaled to each country (or subnational regions) and a trinational
dispute resolution mechanism that would decide cases brought by ag-
grieved workers or non-governmental organizations (NGOs)3
b. The NAFTA Response
During the 1992 presidential election campaign, then-candidate
Clinton made a concession to the organized labor vote by proposing
to make changes to the NAFTA's treatment of labor through the crea-
tion of a vaguely defined labor commission.37 Following his election,
the NAALC and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC) were negotiated with Canada and Mexico.
These were approved by the Congress in conjunction with the
NAFTA.38
The NAALC did little to ameliorate labor's opposition to the
NAFTA. Under the labor agreement, the NAFTA Secretariat is not
empowered to investigate complaints over labor conditions brought
34 OTA Study, supra note 31.
35 Id., 30-47.
36 Id., 47-54. The labor movement might also consider seeking removal of the NAFTA Im-
plementation Act bar against bringing suit directly on the basis of the NAFTA or Labor Supple-
mental Agreement. See ABBOTt, supra note 21, at 116. If this bar were removed, labor groups
might be able to more effectively assure that the United States was actively pursuing its rights vis
a vis Mexico by challenging the decisions of the U.S. National Administrative Office (NAO) in
the federal courts.
37 See ABBorr, supra note 21, at 22.
38 Id. at 29.
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by private parties or interest groups. The Secretariat under the
NAAEC has the power to investigate private complaints. United
States workers have recourse only to a national board (the National
Administrative Office or NAO) in the United States, which may de-
cide to request the Labor Secretary to pursue a complaint with Mex-
ico. 39 The first year of the NAFTA's operation did little to change
labor's view of the agreement, since the U.S. NAO under its limited
mandate rendered two decisions adverse to organized labor. How-
ever, in 1995, both the U.S. and Mexican NAOs adopted separate re-
ports that faulted the enforcement of labor laws by the other NAFTA
Party.4° The activities of the U.S. NAO further expanded in 1996. 1
The most persuasive argument to the unions in favor of the
NAFTA was in a negative form: the situation of the unions would not
be improved in the absence of the NAFTA. Mexico is a sovereign
nation that is entitled to lower its barriers to trade and investment
with or without the cooperation or approval of the United States. If
Mexico chose to provide all possible incentives to attract foreign di-
rect investment from the United States and elsewhere, it could do so
with significantly less serious restraints than it faces under the
NAFTA system.4 2 In essence, the Mexican government could provide
a greater level of incentives for U.S. businesses to move to Mexico
than it did under the NAFTA. Without the NAFTA, if the labor un-
ions wanted to prevent U.S. businesses from moving to Mexico or to
prevent Mexico from exporting low-cost products to the United
States, they would need to persuade the Congress to adopt investment
restrictions enforceable against U.S. companies doing business abroad
or to raise tariff and non-tariff barriers against all U.S. trading part-
ners (because the U.S. faces a Most Favored Nation requirement in
the WTO that prevents it from acting only against Mexico). The
NAFTA provided a framework that is favorable to the unions because
Mexico has accepted certain limitations on its ability to compete for
39 See id., at 113-15. There are similar NAOs in the other NAFTA Parties. Id.
40 See Mexico Union Registration Process Faulted in U.S. NAO Report on Sony, 12 INT'L TR.
REPrm. (BNA) 696 (Apr. 19, 1995) (including comments by labor organizations), and U.S. Re-
views Mexican NAO Request to Discuss Sprint Labor Practices, 12 INT'L TR. REmR. (BNA) 989
(June 7, 1995) (including comments by labor organizations).
41 The U.S. NAO agreed in 1996 to investigate allegations of several human rights and labor
groups that Mexico failed effectively to enforce its labor laws and that Mexico's labor tribunals
are unfair and inequitable. Mexico Asked U.S. to Reject Complaint on Union Rights, but U.S. to
Examine It, 13 INT'L TR. REvr,. (BNA) 1350 (Aug. 21, 1996).
42 Mexico would of course not be acting without any constraints. It is a party, for example, to
various environmental treaties that impose restrictions.
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U.S. direct investment (for example, by agreeing in the Supplemental
Agreement on Labor to maintain high levels of labor protection).
2. Labor's Self-Interest in the FTAA
United States labor union leaders face a choice with respect to
the FTAA process. They can oppose the entire enterprise as antitheti-
cal to their members' interests, or they can seek to influence the nego-
tiations so that the outcome is the most favorable to them. While
these two objectives may be pursued concurrently, unions may not be
welcome in the negotiating arena when they are seeking to undermine
the process.
Unions might well interpret the NAFTA congressional vote as a
strong signal that they do not have the political power to kill the
FTAA. If they lack such power, then common sense suggests that they
should attempt to participate actively in the FTAA formation process
so as to influence the outcome of the negotiations in their favor.
There has already been a proposal from the Brazilian government that
an'FTAA labor agenda be pursued and that labor unions be invited to
participate in the negotiations.43 If the unions do choose to participate
constructively in the FTAA negotiating process, it is important that
they decide on their negotiating objectives. The unions might
demand:
a. Wage Protection
In a best-case scenario from their own perspective, labor unions
would obtain agreement on minimum wage levels across the FTAA at
differential base levels depending on a country party's level of eco-
nomic development and rising in step with productivity gains. This
concept was floated by Democratic members of Congress during the
NAFrA negotiations but dropped after heated opposition from the
U.S. business community. A multicountry agreement on minimum
wages at the outset of the FTAA would encounter similar opposition
from U.S. businesses and, in view of the likely intensity of the opposi-
tion, seems no more likely to succeed in the FrAA context than it did
in the NAFTA context. However, assuming that U.S. labor unions
were seriously to consider pursuing this objective, they would first
need to determine whether unions in other prospective FTAA coun-
tries share their agenda. If labor unions in other FTAA countries
would oppose a minimum wage agreement, then pursuing the matter
43 Brazil Proposes Vice-Ministerial Debate of Labor Role in FTAA Process, INsmE NAFTA
1, 16 (Sept. 4, 1996).
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might only antagonize potential allies. On the other hand, if non-U.S.
unions could be persuaded to support such an initiative, it might at
least be used as a bargaining chip with business groups during the
course of negotiations.
b. Institution Building
A more realistic goal for U.S. labor unions would be an improved
institutional and legal framework for the protection and promotion of
workers' rights. Starting with the NAALC as a base, the unions might
reasonably press for (1) converting the aspirational minimum labor
standards principles embodied in the NAALC into legally enforceable
rules; and (2) achieving at least parity with the terms of the NAAEC
that permit private parties and groups to request "factual records"
with respect to government failures to enforce legal standards. The
NAALC might be taken even a step further by permitting private par-
ties to challenge individual infractions of a core set of labor rules
before an FTAA labor commission.
c. Transition Arrangements
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith pointed out that liberal-
ized trade rules would cause a reallocation of resources, affecting the
distribution of jobs, and thus the security of workers." Smith advo-
cated, inter alia, changes to British labor rules restricting the free
movement of workers in order to ameliorate the effects of liberalized
trade rules. Liberal trade agreements such as the prospective FTAA
can be designed to minimize effects on workers through the use of
substantial transition periods. If liberalizing measures are phased in
over a 10 or 15 year period, many workers who have spent their ca-
reers in a particular industry might be spared the need to seek new
employment. Younger workers who would more likely be affected late
in a transition cycle would have the benefit of advance notice and the
opportunity to seek new employment. The attachment of the U.S.
business community to short term profitability, however, will un-
doubtedly result in opposition to 10 to 15 year transition periods in
the FTAA.
44 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776), reprinted in 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 184 (Robert Maynard Hutchins
et al. eds., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952).
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d. Transnational Organizing
The unions might concentrate on organizing across borders, an
effort they are already undertaking to a certain extent.45 United
States labor unions have historically taken a nationally based ap-
proach to organizing. They might pay more attention to the fact that
changes in the global labor marketplace have placed significant limita-
tions on the progress they can achieve by a single market approach.
The strengthened process of cross-border organizing would also
expose the U.S. labor unions to the diverse perspectives of union lead-
ers in other prospective FTAA countries. If agreement can be reached
as to common union goals, the chances will be greater that those goals
will be achieved in the FTAA.
e. Trade Barriers
Trade barriers are a theoretical solution to solving the problem of
- wage competition that arises as a consequence of multilateral and re-
gional economic integration. Trade barriers may be used to preserve
jobs and wages in industries that are not internationally competitive.
Such barriers operate at a cost both to the country that maintains
them - in the form of transfer payments from competitive sectors to
non-competitive sectors - and to the international economic system
as a whole which, as a consequence, is less productive. The mainte-
nance of trade barriers to protect inefficient domestic industry proved
highly ineffective and counterproductive throughout Latin America in
the 1960s through the 1980s. Selective trade protectionism proved
more successful in some Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s. How-
ever, trade protectionism in the Asian Tigers was not coupled with
high wages and social welfare payments. Quite to the contrary, Asian
trade protectionism was generally coupled with low wages/welfare
payments and a very high rate of savings/investment that permitted
Asian industries to compete on a global scale and, thereby, to stimu-
late economic growth.
There is little reason to believe that a nation with inefficient in-
dustries can use trade barriers to maintain high wage and welfare pay-
ments over an extended period. Industries become efficient, and
maintain their efficiency, by investing in research and development
and plant and equipment. If capital is overspent on social welfare pay-
45 See Remarks of Lance Compa, International Trade and Social Welfare: The New Agenda,
Meeting of the Section on International Law of the American Association of Law Schools (Jan.
7, 1995), in 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 338, 372 (1996).
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ments, the industrial base will necessarily suffer. The engine of job
creation and growth will cease to function effectively. Trade barriers
as a form of wage protection create an economic dilemma. Over the
short term they may provide protection for workers in an inefficient
sector. Over the longer term they drain the economy of its productive
base. The selective use of trade barriers may, however, be successfully
used in transition periods or in making temporary adjustments to
changing conditions.
There is yet no clear answer to the problem of disparity in work-
ing conditions in the United States and Latin America, or among de-
veloped and developing countries in general.46 Even at the ILO, the
principal international organization responsible for the development
of strategies to protect workers' rights, there is a recognition that the
problems of inadequate job creation within the present structure of
the workplace and global marketplace do not, so far, lend themselves
to a solution and certainly not to a simple solution.47 Governments
throughout the European Union are struggling to maintain costly so-
cial programs that benefit their workers in the face of wage competi-
tion from Central and Eastern European and Asian industries. As a
consequence, European Union economies are dramatically adjusting
to become more efficient. Infrastructure industries such as telecom-
munications and air transport are being privatized, the government
procurement sectors are opening to international competitive bidding,
and some costly social welfare programs are being cut. Ultimately the
more efficient Western European industries should be able to com-
pete on a global scale based on technological and productivity
advantages.
The position of organized labor is a very difficult one. The Ameri-
can multinational business community is entrenched in its opposition
to the development of trade-enforceable labor standards. It appears
that the corporate community perceives the interests of organized la-
bor as a substantially greater threat to its profitability than the inter-
ests of the environmental community. Any gains that the unions are
able to achieve in the FTAA will be hard won.
C. Environmental Interests
In 1994, a substantial Republican Party majority was elected to
the U.S. Congress. Their agenda, embodied in a Contract with
46 See generally International Trade and Social Welfare, supra note 45.
47 See, e.g., Michel Hasenne (ILO Director General), The New Path Towards Social Justice,
WORLD OF WORK, No. 8, June 1994, at 4.
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America, included dramatic cutbacks in the level of federal environ-
mental protection. The rejection of this plan by a broad cross-section
of the public taught a very important lesson: Interest in environmen-
tal protection in the United States is not limited to liberal groups op-
erating on the periphery of the public at large. Rather, protection of
the environment is a core value held by a wide cross-section of the
U.S. population.
There are a substantial number of relatively well-organized envi-
ronmental interest groups in the United States, including the Sierra
Club, the National Wildlife Federation, Greenpeace and Public Citi-
zen. These interest groups play a very active role in the national polit-
ical process, having demonstrated a considerable capability to lobby,
to effectively use the media to influence public views, and to employ
litigation to influence government decision-making. United States en-
'vironmental interest groups have been successful in influencing the
agenda of 'the GAIT/WTO and have had at least moderate success in
promoting changes to multilateral trade rules.
1. Environmental Interest Groups and the NAFTA
From the outset, environmental interest groups challenged the
Bush Administration's vision of the NAFTA as a pure trade and in-
vestment vehicle. Their pressure resulted in a NAFTA text that in-
cluded basic elements of environmental protection. In the 1992
presidential election campaign, then-candidate Clinton proposed addi-
tional negotiations with respect to the environment, including the es-
tablishment of a vaguely defined environmental commission.
Following President Clinton's election, the North American Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was negotiated with
Canada and Mexico.
Though the environmental interest group community remained
divided over the wisdom of approving the NAFTA, many environ-
mental NGOs that initially opposed the agreement were ultimately
persuaded that the NAFTA's approach, including the NAAEC, was
an improvement over the GATT (and thus gap-filling) approach.48
The NAAEC Commission, inter alia, is competent to oversee inter-
governmental dispute settlement proceedings concerning allegations
48 See generally Frederick M. Abbott, The NAFTA Environmental Dispute Settlement System
as Prototype for Regional Integration Arrangements, 4 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3, 10-11 (1994), and
Frederick M. Abbott, From Theory to Practice: The Second Phase of the NAFTA Environmental
Regime, in ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE
MEANS? 451 (RUdiger Wolfrum ed., 1996).
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of persistent failure to enforce environmental laws. The NAAEC Sec-
retariat also can examine the conduct of NAFTA governments with
respect to environmental enforcement matters at the request of pri-
vate parties, and produce and publish so-called "factual records." The
NAAEC Commission and its Secretariat have established an ambi-
tious working program that includes detailed studies of the North
American environment. United States environmental interest groups
have been very active in pursuing claims before the NAAEC Commis-
sion and its Secretariat.49 Several complaints have involved the joint
participation of Mexican and Canadian environmental interest groups.
While the environmental NGOs may not be entirely satisfied with the
NAFTA, they are actively working within the environmental protec-
tion system that the NAFTA has created.5
2. Environmental Perspectives on the FTAA
The Republican majority in Congress has refused to extend fast-
track negotiating authority to the Clinton Administration for acces-
sion of Chile to the NAFTA so long as the Clinton Administration
intends to require Chile's accession to the NAAEC and NAALC.5 '
This is a strong signal of domestic political resistance to extending the
NAFTA's environmental provisions to the FrAA. Many Latin Amer-
ican governments were reluctant to include environmental protection
on the agenda for the Summit of the Americas, arguing that trade
issues and environmental issues should be segregated.5 2 The environ-
mental interest groups face a fight to incorporate even NAFTA-com-
parable provisions in the FTAA.
Improvements could certainly be envisaged to the environmental
system of the NAFTA. However, the most immediate agenda for the
environmental interest groups is to assure that the FTAA does not
represent a backsliding from the standards established in the NAFTA.
To this end, a two-pronged strategy would appear appropriate. First,
the environmental interest groups must lobby the Congress as they
did during the NAFTA negotiating process. This time, the groups
49 The first NAFTA Effects Working Papers have been prepared and released by the
NACEC Secretariat. See, eg., John Kirton and Julie Soloway, Assessing NAFTA's Environmental
Effects: Dimensions of a Framework and the NAFTA Regime, NAFTA Effects Working Paper
Series No. 1, April 1966. Requests for the preparation for factual records by the NACEC, re-
sponses and related documents can be found at the NACEC Internet site, http://www.cec.com.
50 Abbott, From Theory to Practice, supra note 48.
51 Regarding this long-running saga, see, e.g., Chile, Canada Gear Up for Talks this Month on
'Bridge' Pact to NAFTA, INsME NAFTA, JAN. 10, 1996, AT 1-3.
52 See, e.g., Officials Laud U.S. Strategy for Achieving Trade Objectives at Summit, INsmFE
NAFTA, Dec. 14, 1994, at 1, 14.
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might highlight the lessons of the Republican Revolution, publicizing
the record of those members of Congress who oppose including envi-
ronmental protections in the FTAA.
Second, the environmental interest groups in the United States
should continue to build common ground with environmental interest
groups in Canada, Mexico and other Latin American countries so that
broad-based pressure can be exerted on governments.
Though the business community historically stood behind govern-
mental efforts to avoid including environmental measures in trade
agreements, there has been a considerable evolution in the attitude of
the business community in this regard over the past five years.53 At
least some business groups appear now to accept that a liberal trade
agenda and measures to protect the environment are not mutually ex-
clusive. Business opposition to trade-enforceable minimum interna-
tional labor standards is a quantum leap more intense than its
opposition to trade-enforceable environmental standards.
D. The Public at Large
Individuals in the United States may be members of interest
groups, such as industry associations, labor unions or environmental
interest groups, that form specific opinions concerning trade policy
issues. Individuals who are active members of such interest groups
may be expected to take into account the views of the leadership of
these groups in terms of forming their opinions and expressing them,
for example, in the voting context. Many individuals, however, do not
participate in a group that develops a defined position in relation to
trade policy, or are not sufficiently tied to the perspective of such a
group so that their opinion is significantly influenced by its leadership.
The diffuse group of individuals who fall outside of the influence of a
particular interest group leadership is the "public at large" or "general
public."54
Both Haas and Lasswell have suggested that the public at large
will not provide leadership in the formation of trade policy 55 Never-
theless, political leaders who formulate and execute trade policy are
53 See, e.g., Remarks of Abraham Katz, U.S. Council for International Business, TRADE AND
=HE NvioRMmENn CHALLENGES FOR 1996, Summary of Conference Sponsored by The Global
Environment & Trade Study and New York University Law School 9-11 (Jan. 19, 1996) (unpub-
lished summary on file with author).
54 Lasswell and Kaplan state, "[a] public consists of the persons in the group who have or
expect to have an opinion. Public opinion is the distribution of opinion in a public." LASSWELL
AND KAPLAN, supra note 16, at 39.
55 See discussion, supra notes 15-19.
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dependent on the goodwill of the public at large, and cannot afford to
implement policy to which the general public is hostile. For political
leaders, it is not so much a question whether the general public sup-
ports a particular trade policy as one of assuring that the general pub-
lic does not oppose it.
1. The Public and the NAFTA
The NAFTA was promoted to the general public by the Bush and
Clinton Administrations largely as a means to increase U.S. exports to
Mexico and thereby to create high-paying jobs in the United States
and as a bulwark against illegal immigration.56 It was, however, well
recognized that the NAFTA's short term effects on trade flows and
jobs were exceedingly difficult to predict and that these effects were
not in any event likely to be significant from a U.S. perspective. Even
if it were well managed, the U.S. job creation effect of the NAFTA
was not likely to be dramatic over the near term.57 There are not suffi-
cient savings or earnings in Mexico to act as a major stimulant to the
U.S. economy. If the NAFTA were poorly managed, the short term
56 The Bush and Clinton Administrations prepared many reports, working papers and press
releases regarding the NAFTA. Executive Branch officials testified at length before various con-
gressional committees, and appeared in other public and private fora. The promotional perspec-
tive of the Executive Branch is encapsulated in Report of the Administration on the North
American Free Trade Agreement and Actions Taken in Fulfillment of the May 1, 1991 Commit-
ments (Sept. 18, 1992) (copy of the report on file with author). The heading of the Executive
Summary at the front of the report states: "NAFTA WILL SPUR GROWTH, GENERATE
JOBS, AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT" ( id. at I). The first section of the Executive
Summary outline is headed: "EXPORTS GENERATE JOBS"(id. at ii). Subheadings under this
heading state:
Mexico is our fastest-growing major export market, our second-largest market for manufac-
tured goods, and our third-largest agricultural market;
NAFTA will create even more opportunities for U.S. growth;
Overwhelming evidence indicates that NAFTA will increase U.S. jobs, wages and growth
(id.)[original text all in capital letters].
The NAFTA was also promoted to advance several secondary goals, such as reducing Mexican
emigration incentives, but the appeal to the general public was largely framed as above. Id.
57 Among the better studies of the potential economic jmpact of the NAFTA see US Inter-
national Trade Commission, The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade Agreement
with Mexico, USITC Pub. No. 2353, Feb. 1991; Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Se-
lected Industries of the North American Free-Trade Agreement, USITC Pub. No. 2596, Jan. 1993;
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, US-Mexico Trade: Pulling Together or Pulling
Apart, ITE-545 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct. 1992); GARY CLYDE
HUFBAUER AND JEFFREY J. ScHorr, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE, Issums AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS 58-59 (1992) (referencing various private sector and academic institution studies); C.A.
Primo Braga, Raed Safadi and Alexander Yeats, Implications of NAFTA for East Asian Ex-
ports, draft by members of International Economics Department, The World Bank (1994) (copy
of draft on file with author) (including detailed summary and analysis of various economic stud-
ies of the NAFTA's impact on third country trade) [hereinafter Primo Braga et al.].
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impact on U.S. trade'flows and jobs would be negative. While predict-
ing favorable short-term trade creation and job growth may have been
politically expedient, and perhaps necessary as a response to certain
extreme claims by some NAFTA opponents, it was a high-risk strategy
that played into the hands of the opponents of integration when the
peso crisis resulted in short-run terms of trade unfavorable to the
United States. An appreciation of the value of integration entails the
consideration of a variety of complex factors and a certain willingness
to maintain a broad long-term value orientation.
2. The Public and the FTAA
As trade policy planners in the United States begin to build polit-
ical support for the FTAA, the focus in public presentation should be
shifted from the short term trade benefits and domestic job creation
that were used to promote the NAFTA to more diffuse public policy
objectives. The general public should be urged to view the FTAA as a
long-term economic and strategic imperative of the United States. The
values of integration should be highlighted: (1) enhancing economic
welfare with proper public choice; (2) cooperating on important issues
of regional concern; (3) promoting the rule of law; (4) improving U.S.
bargaining power vis a vis other regions; (5) extending democracy and
commitments to human rights; and (6) facilitating cultural understand-
ing. These are shared values that support the FTAA in a long-term
context.
A short-term perspective on job creation and export growth is a
dangerous selling point for any international economic program be-
cause of the relatively high level of short-term risk inherent in the
international economic system. There will be unanticipated setbacks
to any integration program brought about by unforeseen events.
Highlighting short-term job creation benefits enhances the likelihood
that a skilled and hostile politician will be able to derail the integra-
tion process during a politically vulnerable period, such as a presiden-
tial election campaign.
III. HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
In 1936, Lasswell made this observation concerning political
power in the United States:
The looser structure of government in the United States [in comparison
to the Soviet Union] none the less confers special influence upon the
Supreme Court of nine, the Presidency of one, and the Congress of a few
hundred. Although any bright and talkative lad in the United States may
be told that one day he may be president, only eight boys made it in the
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last generation. The potent American Senate, though comparatively
large, would provide a place for only 480 Senators each generation were
none reelected. Deference pyramids, in form and fact, are steep.
5 8
A. The U.S. Congress
The attitudes and actions of members of the U.S. Congress are
critical to the long-term success of the NAFTA and FTAA. The U.S.
Congress must ultimately be asked to approve the FTAA agreement,
and will continue to exercise close supervision over implementation of
the NAFTA. The question arises whether giving the Congress a more
active role in the formulation and implementation of integration pol-
icy would appreciably increase the likelihood that the FrAA will be
approved, or that implementation of the NAFTA will be facilitated.
1. Congressional Interests
Political leaders are individuals who have sought after power.5 9
An individual in a position of political power obtains personal satis-
faction though exercising control over the opinions and behavior of
others. ° High political office in the United States is rarely achieved by
a simple stroke of good fortune. It is achieved, rather, by an individ-
ual's dedicated pursuit to political fund-raising and campaigning.
Campaigning in the present day includes certainty of media inquiry
into the private life of the individual, and attacks by rivals on the indi-
vidual's personality. Individuals are unlikely to expose themselves to
such inquiry and attacks absent a strong psychological motivation.
Whether or not the leaders of the U.S. Congress support the pro-
cess of hemispheric integration may well depend upon whether the
process is perceived as enhancing or diminishing the power of the
58 LAsswE.L, PoLnrcs: WHO GmTs WHAT, WHEN, How, supra note 16, at 4.
59 Lasswell and Kaplan observe: "A person whose conduct is politicized to a high degree is a
politician. The term has reference, therefore, not merely to the holding or striving for political
office, but to the tendency to consider always the effect on influence or power position of pro-
jected lines of conduct." LASSwELL AND KAPiAN, supra note 16, at 146. In WHO GETS WHAT,
WrEN, How, Lasswell writes: "Whatever the special form of political expression, the common
trait of the political personality type is emphatic demand for deference. When such a motive is
associated with skill in manipulation, and with timely circumstances, an effective politician is the
result. The fully developed political type works out his destiny in the world of public objects in
the name of public good. He displaces private motives on public objects in the name of collective
advantage." LAsswnL, supra note 16, at 16.
60 That an individual obtains personal satisfaction through exercising political power is not a
value judgment - power may be exercised well or poorly. It rather identifies the source of the
individual's motivation.
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Congress and its members.6' Congress possesses the power to approve
or reject economic integration arrangements, so members of Congress
already possess a form of quasi-absolute power over the hemispheric
integration process. 62 However, this power is presently exercised more
or less as an on/off switch. While Congress is consulted during the
negotiation of the integration agreement, it is largely negotiated by
the Executive Branch.63 Once the agreement is approved, the Execu-
tive Branch is almost wholly responsible for its implementation. To
the extent that the integration process is increasingly important to
economic life in the United States and abroad - that is, to the extent
that global and regional economic affairs become more important rel-
ative to domestic economic affairs - one might view congressional
approval of integration agreements as the delegation of increasing
61 In some "foreign policy" endeavors involving the conduct of political relations and mili-
tary affairs, the President may, on a constitutionally sound basis, act without the support of the
Congress. But it is pointless, and probably counter-productive, for the President to invest the
political capital of the United States in a major trade agreement negotiation absent a reasonable
expectation that the Congress ultimately will approve the results of the negotiations. The Consti-
tution requires that the Congress, or two-thirds of the Senate, approve the ratification of a major
trade agreement. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M.
Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, in
PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY 261 (Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott eds., 1994).
62 The U.S. Constitution expressly grants to the Congress the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The primacy of the Congress in the field of
international trade is well accepted. While Congress generally delegates broad authority to the
President to negotiate trade agreements and to carry out trade policy, the President acts in this
field only pursuant to congressional authorization. International trade agreements are treaties
and their ratification also may be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. For example, The
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties entered into by the United States with
many of its major trading partners, which establish the ground rules for economic cooperation,
were entered into with the advise and consent of the Senate. See Frederick M. Abbott, NAFTA
and the Future of United States-European Community Trade Relations: The Consequences of
Asymmetry in an Emerging Era of Regionalism, 16 HAsTINGs INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 489, 496
n.27 (1993) (discussing relevant treaties).
63 The fast-track legislative process has come to be used for the negotiation and approval of
major trade agreements. For statutory references and timetables of the fast-track approval pro-
cess see ABBoT-r, supra note 21, at 21. When Congress grants the President fast-track negotiating
authority, the President commits to consult actively with the Congress during the agreement
negotiation phase, in exchange for congressional commitment expeditiously to consider and vote
on approval of the agreement that is negotiated, without proposal for amendment. A majority of
each house of Congress must vote in favor of the agreement. One of the primary objectives of
the fast-track legislation is to assure that Congress is adequately apprised of trade agreement
negotiations. This should both provide adequate opportunity for congressional input into the
agreement, and assure that there are few major surprises in the text ultimately transmitted to
Congress by the President. Yet the congressional role in the fast-track process is nevertheless a
relatively passive one. Proposals for trade agreements arise in the Executive Branch, and negoti-
ations are carried out by the Executive Branch. This practice is generally reflected in constitu-
tional democracies of the western world. See generally Riesenfeld and Abbott, supra note 61.
Foundation-Building for Integration
17:900 (1996-97)
power to the Executive Branch of government, at least theoretically at
the expense of congressional power. Though it seems doubtful that
members of Congress would express themselves in these terms, they
may object to the pursuit of integration agreements because the
agreements diminish their power relative to the Executive Branch.
Identifying this political power dilemma suggests that the self-in-
terest of members of Congress could be addressed if the hemispheric
integration process were not viewed as diminishing their political
power and might be enhanced if it were perceived as increasing their
political power. Both of these objectives are achievable within the lim-
its of the Constitution.64 The important corollary question is, of
course, at what benefit or cost to the structure and operation of the
integration process itself?
B. Two Alternatives to Enhancing the Power of Congress
There are a variety of ways in which the power of Congress rela-
tive to the regional integration process could be enhanced. These in-
clude expanding congressional involvement in the proposal and
negotiation phases and expanding congressional involvement in the
implementation phase of an agreement. There follow two proposals.
The first is a proposal designed to enhance the role of the Congress in
the agreement formation phase through the establishment of a Joint
Congressional Committee on Integration Policy and Planning. The
second is a proposal designed to expand the role of Congress through
the establishment of an inter-governmental/regional parliamentary as-
sembly in the NAFTA/FTAA. Either of these proposals might be pur-
sued independently. For reasons discussed below, the author suggests
that only the second proposal should be pursued in the near to me-
dium term. However, the first proposal is outlined as an alternative
for longer term consideration.
1. The Joint Congressional Committee
Although it would seem likely that enhancing the role of the Con-
gress in the negotiation phase of the FTAA would be beneficial at the
approval juncture, there is good reason to be hesitant to grant a more
substantive role to the Congress.65 If a more active role for the Con-
64 On the U.S. constitutional implications of western hemispheric integration, see generally
Frederick M. Abbott, The Maastricht Judgment, the Democracy Principle and US Participation in
Western Hemispheric Integration, 37 GERmAN Y.B. INT'L L. 137 (1994).
65 Historically, parliaments and legislatures have tended to act as a conservative brake on,
rather than as an initiator of, foreign policy initiatives. Over the past two or three decades, as
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gress were deemed desirable, then this result could be achieved by the
creation of a Joint Committee on Integration Policy and Planning.
However, the following proposal for a Joint Committee is not a rec-
ommendation for its creation. This proposal is instead discussed in the
context of its potential positives and negatives. For the time being, the
creation of a more powerful Integration Committee may not be a wise
idea. There is a continuing tendency of the Congress to act more con-
servatively, and with less appreciation of consequences on the interna-
tional plane, than the Executive Branch. However, as the Congress
assumes an increasingly important role in international economic af-
fairs and as the consequences of congressional action in this field are
more carefuflly considered, the balance of considerations may weigh in
favor of the creation of such a Joint Committee.
At present, a substantial number of Senate and House Commit-
tees consider NAFTA and FTAA-related matters under their jurisdic-
tion. The House Ways and Means and International Relations
Committees and the Senate Finance and Foreign Relations Commit-
tees, have been very active in considering NAFTA-related issues.66 A
Joint Committee on Integration Policy and Planning may have several
responsibilities, such as (1) primary oversight of the NAFTA and
other regional integration arrangements to which the United States is
or becomes a party; (2) formal communication with the Executive
Branch (see discussion regarding Executive Branch reorganization, in-
fra); (3) review of and reporting on legislative proposals regarding the
NAFTA, FTAA and comparable arrangements;67 and (4) formulation
of congressional policy with respect to the NAFTA, FTAA, and com-
parable arrangements.
The Senate and House of Representatives might each appoint
members to the Joint Committee from the majority and minority
chairs of existing Committees and Subcommittees (Foreign Relations
and International Relations, Finance and Ways and Means, Labor and
global integration has become manifest and as the importance of treaty commitments has be-
come clear, parliaments have demanded and obtained a generally greater role in treaty-making
and foreign affairs. However, executives remain reluctant to include parliaments in the details of
foreign policy, and prefer at most to seek guidance on broad negotiating principles. See Remarks
of Thomas Cottier, in Riesenfeld and Abbott, supra note 61, at 535-37.
66 The NAFTA Implementation Act requires the Executive to conduct limited consultations
with the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee over proclama-
tions made and regulations issued pursuant to the NAFrA. The North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 3311, et seq. (1994)) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act], at 19 U.S.C. § 3313.
67 Matters might be referred by the Joint Committee for concurrent review by other relevant
Senate and House committees as appropriate.
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Human Resources and Economic and Educational Opportunities, and
so forth). Members of the Joint Committee might also be appointed
from the Senate and House membership at large. The number of seats
on the Committee should be great enough to assure that an adequate
cross section of interests and perspectives are represented, but small
enough to permit a work program to be carried out effectively. For
example, twelve members from each house, for a total of 24, could
provide a balance of representation of interests without being too un-
wieldy in size.68
There are numerous ways to vary the Joint Committee proposal.
For example, the Committee's responsibilities could be reduced to
only an oversight and reporting function, as opposed to performing a
more direct role in the legislative process. Each house of Congress
might also create its own integration committee or subcommittee
whose members would meet in conference as appropriate.
An historical precedent for a relatively powerful Joint Committee
can be found in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,69 established
in 1946, which is discussed further below. There are several Joint Con-
gressional Committees presently in operation, though with less com-
prehensive charters than that of my proposal for a Joint Committee on
Integration Policy and Planning. For example, there is a 20 Member
Joint Economic Committee, with ten members from each house, that
studies annual economic reports submitted by the President and
makes recommendations it considers appropriate to the Senate and
House.
70
The historical record suggests that the establishment of a Joint
Committee with a significant role in the legislative process is constitu-
tionally permissible. There might, however, need to be some specific
limits on the authority of the Committee. For example, Article I, Sec-
68 The specific number of representatives is not for present purposes a critical issue, or one
which could be settled by an objective formula.
69 See generally ALFRED C. AmAN, JR., ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 7-1 to 7-9
(1983).
70 15 U.S.C. see. 1024 (1994). See also Joint Committee on the Library, 2 U.S.C. § 132b
(1994), and Joint Committee on Taxation, 26 U.S.C. § 8002 (1994). For reference to Joint Com-,
mittee on the Conduct of the War, dating to 1861, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC, How
CONGRESS WORKS 30 (1983).
Other possible models for a parliamentary review structure include the Committee of the
U.K. House of Commons and the Select Committee of the House of Lords, which consider
proposed European Union legislation, review proposals from the government with respect to the
European Union, and generate their own proposals. Similar review committees exist in other
EU parliaments. See Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI-KENT
L REv. 459, 476-80 (1991).
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tion 7 of the U.S. Constitution limits revenue bills to initiation in the
House. So the Committee might be restricted in this respect. The
powers of the Joint Committee would therefore have to be limited as
required by the Constitution. The specific structure and powers would
not be of so great a concern as the fact of its establishment in some
form that reasonably demonstrated the commitment of the Congress
to the integration process. A more powerful committee would reflect
a greater commitment than a less powerful committee. It would, how-
ever, be important to avoid an extended battle over the constitutional-
ity of the committee and its prerogatives. Such a battle would itself
reflect division over the value of the integration process.
The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, estab-
lished in 1946, consisted of eighteen members, nine from each house
of Congress, and had jurisdiction over all bills, resolutions, and other
matters relating to the Atomic Energy Commission and the develop-
ment, use and control of atomic energy.71 This Committee was estab-
lished in the immediate post-World War II period, when development
and control of atomic power was considered an essential national se-
curity and welfare objective. There was a widely perceived need to
assure that the government maintained direct control over potential
military applications of the atom and also to assure the aggressive pur-
suit of what was then perceived as a potentially cheap and unlimited
source of energy for the public at large.72 Although the results of the
U.S. atomic energy program did not meet the visions of the 1940s and
1950s, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is recognized to have
played an important role in encouraging the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion to pursue the creation of a competitive commercial nuclear
power industry.73 In establishing the Joint Committee, Congress
stressed the importance of the particular subject matter, and the need
to attend to an action program.
The formation of a Joint Congressional Committee on Integra-
tion Policy and Planning. would signal an important shift in congres-
sional attitudes toward the NAFTA and FTAA. A permanent
committee would signal a long term commitment and a seriousness of
purpose. This should influence internal congressional psychology, as
well as external perceptions. The Joint Committee might also serve to
insulate congressional representatives at large from public pressures.
As with the ordinary legislative process, non-members of the Joint
71 AMAN, supra note 69, at 7-2.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 7-6.
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Committee would not be primary targets of public (and lobbyist) at-
tention during the early phases of legislative initiation and would be
subjected to more intense pressures only after a proposal is voted out
of the Committee. A referral from the Committee would act as a
buffer against public pressures. In addition, the Joint Committee
would be able to devote more systematic attention to problems associ-
ated with the NAFTA, FTAA and other integration efforts than could
the current, diffuse system of multiple House and Senate committees
and subcommittees. In other words, better policy decisions might re-
sult. Finally, the creation of the Joint Committee would send a strong
signal to U.S. integration partners regarding the seriousness of U.S.
commitment to these endeavors, stimulating a reciprocal commit-
ments on other sides.
There are, of course, obstacles and potential drawbacks to this
proposal. As with any such proposal, a major obstacle is persuading
the Congress to take the step. Although Congress possesses the pri-
mary foreign commerce power, it has historically delegated the pre-
ponderance of the policy-formation role to the Executive. In an era in
which international economic relations are increasingly vital to the
U.S. and foreign economies, a perception that the power of the Con-
gress and its members would be enhanced by the creation and opera-
tion of the Joint Committee might incline them to take this step.
The most significant potential drawback of this proposal is that
the Joint Committee may adopt an isolationist or obstructionist role
with respect to the widening or deepening of the integration process.
If a majority of members of Congress are hostile to a progressive inte-
gration policy, might not investing a Committee with more effective
power over policy formation in fact impede progress? Members of the
Committee may be reluctant to accept responsibility for policy initia-
tives. Interest groups may find it easier to exert pressure on members
of the Committee than on the USTR.
There is no simple response to the foregoing critique. Histori-
cally, the U.S. Congress has tended to act as a brake on foreign policy
initiative, as opposed to a driving force. However, the following points
appear relevant. First, a small and powerful Committee of congres-
sional leaders may be more likely to take an active role in initiating
policy than the diffuse congressional membership as a whole. Leaders
should be more inclined to seek credit for the creation of new policy
initiatives than to play the role of spoilers. Second, Congress must in
the final analysis approve integration proposals from the Executive
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and must in any event be brought around to the Executive view.74 The
Executive's ultimate persuasion of committees of the Congress, and of
a majority of the Congress as a whole, cannot be avoided. In the final
analysis, the question is one of the setting for the persuasion.
Congress approved the NAFTA and Uruguay Round Agree-
ments after extensive debate of both. This demonstrated responsible
congressional leadership. Yet the Republican-led Congress has re-
fused to grant President Clinton authority to negotiate Chile's acces-
sion to the NAFTA so long as the Executive Branch intends to seek
extension of the NAFTA's environmental and labor Supplemental
Agreements. These Supplemental Agreements are at the heart of the
socially progressive elements of the NAFTA. The Republican leader-
ship of the Congress also initiated the Helms-Burton legislation which
was all but designed to infuriate U.S. trading partners in Europe and
Latin America. Congress may well be more likely to approve the
FTAA if it plays a more active role in its creation. However, conserva-
tive congressional tendencies might lead to an agreement that is less
than desirable from a social welfare standpoint.
On the whole, the risk of creating a Joint Congressional Commit-
tee at present appears to outweigh the gains from facilitating approval
of the FTAA because of the continuing conservative attitudes of many
members of Congress. In another decade, the balance of consideration
may have changed.
2. The Inter-governmental Parliamentary Committee
The President and Executive Branch require the ongoing cooper-
ation of the Congress across the entire legislative agenda (including
the passage of the federal budget), so that as a general proposition the
Executive Branch does not ignore the views of the Congress with re-
spect to the implementation of the NAFTA or other international
programs.75
The NAFTA" establishes no parliamentary body of its own. That
is, there is no provision for the public election of members of a
74 The fast-track legislative mechanism recently used for the approval of trade agreements
takes cognizance of this fact by providing for continuous consultation between the two branches.
See Riesenfeld and Abbott, supra note 61, at 261, 302. If the congressional side of the fast-track
equation is more highly concentrated, the Executive's task of persuasion may be simplified.
75 The NAFTA Implementation Act includes limited provision for the layover of implement-
ing measures with congressional committees. 19 U.S.C. § 3133(a). These provisions do not mate-
rially affect the power of the Executive Branch to implement the agreement. Id.
There are also provisions regarding consultation with State government officials when measures
will directly relate to or have a direct impact on the States. 19 U.S.C. § 3132(b).
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NAFTA body with the power to adopt or to participate in the adop-
tion of legislative measures. Furthermore, there is no provision in the
NAFTA for the participation of members of the national parliaments
of the respective Parties in the formulation of NAFTA policy, except
as those parliaments are generally empowered by the national consti-
tutions of the Parties to act with respect to general legislation and
treaties.76 In this respect the NAFTA may be contrasted with the Eu-
ropean Union, which includes a parliament of representatives directly
elected by the public in the Member States. The powers of the EU
Parliament to influence EU legislation, while not comparable to that
of most national parliaments, has gradually increased since the crea-
tion of the EC/Union.
The power of members of the U.S. Congress to influence the for-
mation and implementation of hemispheric integration policy could be
enhanced through the creation of an inter-parliamentary body at the
regional level. Since the NAFTA regional institutions - and presum-
ably the FTAA regional institutions - have very limited power to
adopt secondary legislation, the powers of an inter-parliamentary
body would likewise be limited. However, a variety of important pur-
poses could be served by the creation of such a body.
First, regular meetings among parliamentarians of the different
member countries of the NAFTA and/or FTAA would expose these
members to perspectives that they are unlikely to hear in their own
national capitols. This may increase the openness of members of na-
tional parliaments to proposals that do not directly implicate their
own constituencies.
Second, members of national parliaments could be more directly
exposed to and consulted about the programs of the various regional
working groups. The work of these groups may eventually require na-
tional parliamentary approval, and the groundwork for such approval
could be laid at regional parliamentary meetings.
Third, an inter-parliamentary body could contribute to the for-
mulation of future work programs with proposals of its own. Such ac-
tivity would more directly connect parliamentarians to the decision
structure of the integration program, and thereby invest the parlia-
mentarians with a more direct interest in outcomes.
76 Thus, for example, the NAFTA acknowledges that the adherence of new Parties will take
place "following approval in accordance with the applicable procedures of each country"
(NAFTA art. 2204:1), and that the parliaments of the Parties must approve changes to national
legislation regarding technical standards. See e.g., NAFTA Annex 913.5a-3, para. 4 (adoption of
automotive standards).
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Fourth, the participation of national parliamentarians would in-
crease the number of elected officials directly involved in the hemi-
spheric integration process, enhancing its democratic character. This
may have the very favorable long term effect of increasing the percep-
tion on the part of members of the public at large that they have a
voice in the integration process.
In terms of institutional structure, and taking the NAFTA as an
example, key members of the national parliaments of each of the Par-
ties could meet together on an annual basis or at other regular inter-
vals. These meetings could be rotated among national capitols. At
these meetings, parliamentarians could review proposals from the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission and other NAFTA committees
which might entail the adoption of legislation in their respective coun-
tries. Parliamentarians could present their perspectives on work pro-
grams to the Commission and to each other. Parliamentarians could
attempt to formulate a joint proposal for a work program by the Com-
mission and relevant NAFTA committees.
At about the same time as the first draft of this article was being
written, the countries of the Mercosur were creating an inter-parlia-
mentary body along the lines suggested here.77 The Joint Parliamen-
tary Commission of the Mercosur is given advisory powers that are
consistent with the powers that might be accorded to a NAFTA or
FTAA parliamentary body.78 If the powers of such a body were to be
more than advisory, there would need to be significant structural
changes taking into account the relative populations of the Parties and
77 The creation of the Mercosur institutional structure through the adoption of the Common
Market Treaty of Asunci6n of 1991 (Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing a
Common Market [Done at Asunci6n, March 26, 1991], 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991)), the Brasilia Pro-
tocol on Dispute Settlement, also of 1991, (Protocolo de Brasilia para a Soluqdo de Controv6r-
sias (MercosurCMClDec. No. 1/1991), Boletin de Integragao Latino-Americana/Edigfo Especial
- MRE/SGIE/NAT 195) and the adoption of the Protocol of Ouro Preto on the Institutional
Structure of the Mercosur of December 1994 (Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Additional
Protocol to the Treaty of Asunsi6n on the Institutional Structure of the Mercosur ("Protocol of
Ouro Preto") [done at Ouro Preto, Brazil, December 17, 1994], 34 LL.M. 1244 (1995), are
among the most interesting development in the field of regional integration in the past decade.
The Mercosur institutional structure contains a number of innovative features that deserve close
attention both from NAFTA planners and from the architects of the FTAA. These include a
consensus-based decisional structure that incorporates the power to adopt rules binding on
States Parties, 30 I.L.M. 1054-59 (Annex 11), a dispute resolution system that mandates compli-
ance, id. at 1059 (Annex IIn), as well as the novel inter-parliamentary consultation arrangement
designed to facilitate the implementation of decisions and enhance parliamentary input into the
integration process. 34 I.L.M. at 1253 (Section IV).
78 The powers of the Mercosur regional institutions are more extensive than those of the




other factors. The operative provisions of the Protocol of Ouro Preto,
relating to the inter-parliamentary body, are useful in illustrating this
concept:
The Joint Parliamentary Commission
Article 22
The Joint Parliamentary Commission is the organ representing the
parliaments of the States Parties within the Mercosur.
Article 23
The Joint Parliamentary commission shall consist of equal numbers of
members of parliament representing the States Parties.
Article 24
The members of the Joint Parliamentary Commission shall be ap-
pointed by the respective national parliaments, in accordance with
their internal procedures.
Article 25
The Joint Parliamentary Commission shall endeavour to speed up the
corresponding internal procedures in the States Parties in order to en-
sure the prompt entry into force of the decisions taken by the
Mercosur organs provided for in Article 2 of this Protocol. Similarly, it
shall assist with the harmonization of legislations [sic], as required to
advance the integration process. When necessary, the Council shall
request the Joint Parliamentary Commission to examine priority
issues.
Article 26
The Joint Parliamentary Commission shall submit Recommendations
to the Council of the Common Market through the Common Market
Group.
Article 27
Joint Parliamentary Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure.
The creation of an inter-parliamentary body in the NAFTA/
FTAA context would enhance the visible role of members of the U.S.
Congress in the integration process. This would appear to enhance the
power of such members in the international arena. As such, the crea-
tion of such a body should be in the self-interest of congressional
members. The proposed role is advisory and only an incremental
step.79 For the near term such an incremental step may be more desir-
able, for reasons set out above, than substantially enhancing the direct
role of the Congress in integration planning and implementation.
79 Because of the suggested advisory role of the inter-parliamentary body, it should not raise
constitutional issues in the United States. An inter-parliamentary body with more extensive
powers could at least raise such issues. See generally Abbott, supra note 64, at 156-57.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:900 (1996-97)
C. The President and the Executive Branch
1. Presidential Interests
Among the branches of the federal government, the Executive
Branch plays the most direct role in the formulation and implementa-
tion of hemispheric integration policy. The Executive Branch during
the Bush Administration proposed the NAFTA and was largely re-
sponsible for its drafting. The effective power of the Executive Branch
is considerable in respect to the hemispheric integration process, both
in relation to the Congress and the Judiciary and in relation to foreign
governments. The President proposes, negotiates, signs and (subject
to congressional approval) ratifies integration agreements. The Presi-
dent is largely responsible for their execution. The President of the
United States is at the peak of the political pyramid of the single larg-
est national economy in the world and, as such, possesses great power
relative to the heads of state of other national governments.
The President and Vice President are the sole elected officials in
the Executive Branch. The President is an individual who has sought
after political power and has succeeded in obtaining it. To the extent
that hemispheric economic relations are important and to the extent
that the President controls such relations, the President has a self in-
terest in continuing (and even enhancing) the role ascribed to him or
her. An increase in the power of Congress may decrease the relative
power of the President both in the domestic and hemispheric/interna-
tional arenas. Nevertheless, the President is dependent upon the Con-
gress for approval of hemispheric integration programs, and must
compromise his/her own desire to exercise power with that of Mem-
bers of Congress. Whether a President is willing to effect such a com-
promise will depend on his/her evaluation of whether his/her program
can be accomplished without such compromise. During the NAFTA
negotiations, for example, the Bush Administration was forced to
compromise its position on environmental matters at the insistence of
Democratic members of Congress in order to achieve an agreement
that would secure passage.
A President must, of course, also look to the prospects for his or
her election and reelection. Since the Democratic Party historically
has enjoyed the political support of labor unions, the Clinton Admin-
istration may have perceived an interest in slowing down the FTAA
negotiations in 1996 in order to avoid alienating labor union support
during the reelection process. The Clinton Administration appears
committed to implementing the NAFTA and pursuing the FTAA over
the longer term, though there remains reason to question whether a
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Democratic administration will actively promote liberal trade agree-
ments in the face of labor union opposition. Both the NAFTA and
the Uruguay Round Agreements were initiated by Republican
Administrations.
The best case scenario from the perspective of a Democratic ad-
ministration will be to obtain some measure of labor union support, or
at least tolerance, of the integration agenda. Specific program features
that might appeal to the unions have already been discussed. How the
labor unions will perceive their self interest in the hemispheric inte-
gration agenda remains to some extent an open question. However, in
order to encourage labor union support (or tolerance), the Executive
Branch should at least treat labor representatives with the same level
of interest and respect that it treats business lobbyists. Organized la-
bor must be convinced that the government will be responsive to its
perspective.
2. Institutional Improvement
The hemispheric integration process is not the central concern of
any significant U.S. government entity. The U.S. agency principally
responsible for coordinating and supervising NAFTA-related matters
and the FTAA negotiations is the Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative.80 The entire staff of the USTR, including administrative staff, is
approximately 200 individuals. This group is responsible for virtually
all ongoing U.S. trade negotiations, including those involving the
WTO, the European Union, Japan, the PRC, ASEAN, and so forth.8'
The office is often in a state of crisis management, and it does an ex-
cellent job in this respect.82 It would be unrealistic, however, to sug-
gest that the USTR's Office is engaged in ongoing NAFTA and FTAA
supervision and policy analysis as its central focus. In addition to the
USTR, NAFrA-related and FTAA functions are spread throughout
the federal government, including the EPA, the International Trade
80 See generally JOHN JACKSON ET AI., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 149-51 (3d
ed. 1995).
81 See generally, STEVEN DRYDEN, TRADE WARRIORS: USTR AND THE AMERICAN CRU-
SADE FOR FREE TRADE (1995). The Commerce Department actively supports export efforts by
U.S.-based enterprises, and Commerce activities include negotiating with foreign governments.
These are largely transaction-based activities as opposed to inter-governmental negotiations re-
garding trade agreements. The allocation of negotiating responsibilities as between federal agen-
cies is somewhat fluid, and over the course of the past several decades there have been a number
of turf battles concerning such negotiations. Id.
82 The USTR is granted specific authority to coordinate implementation of the NAFTA
under both its general legislative mandate, 5 U.S.C. § 903 (1994), and specific provisions of the
NAFTA implementing legislation. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312-17.
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Commission, and the Commerce, Treasury, State, and Labor Depart-
ments. Each of these agencies takes responsibility for hemispheric in-
tegration-related matters within its own field of expertise, though
generally under the coordinating eye of the USTR's Office.83
The hemispheric integration process might be treated differently.
An Office of Integration Policy and Planning (OIPP) could be estab-
lished within the federal government. It might be headed by a Cabi-
net-level individual who is U.S. representative to the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission. That person may be the USTR or a newly ap-
pointed Director-General of the OIPP. The OIPP would include a
staff of professional technical experts who will be responsible for re-
viewing implementation of the NAFTA by the United States, Mexico
and Canada, and for coordinating the FTAA negotiations. The OIPP
should be responsible for initiating, conducting and reviewing studies
with respect to the NAFTA and FTAA. The OIPP should be author-
ized to obtain the cooperation of other federal agencies in the pursuit
of its mission. The OIPP should be as large, but need not be larger
than, the present Office of the USTR (150 professionals, 50 staff). Its
staff can be drawn from the USTR, Commerce, EPA, Treasury, Labor,
ITC and so forth.84 All Executive Branch hemispheric integration pro-
posals to the Congress should flow from the OIPP, even if not initi-
ated there.
The essential justification for the creation of this office is that the
NAFTA and FTAA programs should not be treated as other federal
programs. These are arrangements that will broadly and deeply affect
the lives of individuals throughout this hemisphere and the world.
They should be approached with the best public policy planning mech-
anisms we can devise.
IV. NEo-FUNCTIONAL CONVERGENCE
A. Convergence and Conflict
The basic lesson of neo-functionalism must be stressed. Regional
integration in the western hemisphere will not succeed simply because
there is a convergence of interests among U.S. groups that most
strongly influence the process. Regional integration may succeed if
there is a confluence of interests among the powerful interest groups
in the various countries of the region that will lead the process - the
83 Coordination of Trade Policy is also undertaken at the National Security Council level.
Author's discussions with USTR officials.
84 If for no other reason than to avoid present restrictions on new federal government hiring.
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United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Vene-
zuela, among the major hemispheric economies. For example:
Business Groups. Business groups are powerful not only in the United
States. They play a leading role throughout the hemisphere. The inter-
ests of the leaders of U.S.-based businesses and the interests of Brazil-
ian-based businesses are not necessarily the same.
Labor Unions. Labor unions may be more powerful in countries outside
the United States than within it. Argentina's history has been shaped by
a powerful labor movement. The interests of labor unions in the various
countries of the hemisphere are likely to differ.
Environmental Groups. Environmental interest groups in developing
countries may not prioritize their interests in the same way as U.S. envi-
ronmental interest groups.
Political leaders throughout the hemisphere function in decidedly
diverse contexts. Few of the countries of the western hemisphere have
enjoyed the political stability and democratic tradition of the United
States. Many have endured decades of authoritarian/military rule.
Some cannot be considered stable today. There is a wide disparity in
the level of economic development that separates nations of the west-
ern hemisphere, and there are many cultural differences to overcome.
Additionally, anti-U.S. sentiment has pervaded the political processes
of some countries throughout the second half of this century.
While any competent trade negotiator might be able to draft an
FTAA in a matter of weeks, the drafting of such an agreement will not
create a regional integration arrangement. Trade negotiators must first
seek to identify the interests of the various actors and groups through-
out the region that will play important roles in the process by which
the agreement is approved and implemented, and seek to channel
those interests into an arrangement that accommodates them.
B. Convergence and Institutions
Haas stressed the importance of incorporating institutions with
effective decision-making power at the regional level in regional ar-.
rangements to promote the spillover effect, and thereby to accelerate
the integration process. The scope of the FTAA and the wide disparity
in interests and power among its prospective members make it un-
likely that any strong regional institutions will be included in its initial
framework. However, the NAFTA experience has suggested a few
ideas for the FTAA institutional structure that might function as a
base point for effective regional institutions that would evolve over a
period of decades.
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1. The FTAA Director-General
The NAFTA's Free Trade Commission meets only sporadically.8 5
The day-to-day coordination of inter-governmental relations is done
through the NAFTA Secretariat. However, the term "Secretariat" is
rather deceptive in the NAFTA context because there is no single en-
tity comprising a Secretariat, nor is there a single Secretary-General.
Rather, each Party maintains its own national NAFTA Secretariat of-
fice.86 All of the various NAFTA committees and working groups are
expected to function under the coordination of these national Secreta-
riat offices. 7 In the U.S. NAFTA administration system, the U.S. Sec-
retariat is not expected to play an independent policy formation role,
but rather to implement decisions by the USTR and other federal
agencies.8 8 The NAFTA qua NAFTA has no Director-General. There
is no one charged with identifying and articulating the problems the
Parties face collectively.
FTAA planners might consider establishing the office of Direc-
tor-General to give personality to the arrangement, and to facilitate
the identification of issues that transcend individual nation-state
interests.
2. Regional Committees
a. Fiscal and Monetary Concerns
The peso crisis highlighted the need to include a Committee on
Fiscal and Monetary Transparency in the FTAA framework. Euro-
pean Union policy planners have long recognized the importance of
fiscal and monetary policy cooperation among the Member States,
85 The Free Trade Commission is composed of cabinet level representatives of the Parties. It
acts by consensus. It acts primarily to coordinate the activities of the Parties. It is obligated to
meet once per year. See ABBOTt, supra note 21, at 28-29.
86 Pursuant to the NAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3315, the U.S. Section of the
NAFTA Secretariat may be established within any department or agency of the U.S. govern-
ment, but shall operate under the supervision of the Interagency Group. 19 U.S.C. § 3432. The
Interagency Group is chaired by the USTR and will consist of such officers of the U.S. govern-
ment that the USTR considers appropriate. Id., § 3432(c)(2)(A).
87 The institutional arrangements established under the Supplemental Agreements on the
Environment and Labor are important exceptions to this general situation. The North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) provides for the creation of a North
American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACAC), which includes, inter alia, a
permanent Secretariat with a single Executive Director. The NAAEC Council is charged with
making recommendations to the Parties on environmental matters. See Abbott, supra note 21, at
109-10; Abbott, From Theory to Practice: The Second Phase of the NAFTA Environmental Re-
gime, supra note 48.
88 Confirmed in author's conversations with USTR officials.
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even if they have not always been successful in achieving their desired
aims. 9 There is no present basis for discussion of coordinated fiscal
policy among western hemispheric governments. There may well be
substantial obstacles to the creation of an effective regional exchange
rate policy. Rate bands and pegs may be difficult to defend in an era
of speculation and volatility in financial markets.90 In the short to me-
dium term, central bank and treasury transparency, discussion and co-
operation may represent the outer limit of a viable policy on fiscal and
monetary matters. The Committee on Fiscal and Monetary Policy
might have as its members the senior financial managers of the Party
governments. These members might exchange information and con-
sult on desirable changes in fiscal and monetary policy.91
b. Infrastructure
A Committee on Infrastructure Development might be estab-
lished in the FTAA framework. The Committee on Infrastructure De-
velopment could provide a forum for technical assistance to FrAA
public works officials. It could be used to plan and propose infrastruc-
ture projects. The Committee might include representatives from the
public and private sectors, as well as NGOs. It could play an active
role in pursuing project funding from international institutions and the
private sector, in addition to making recommendations to the Party
governments for public funding.
None of the foregoing suggestions represents a dramatic depar-
ture from the existing NAFTA structure in the sense of empowering
central regional institutions to undertake decisions on behalf of the
Parties. Even from a medium-term perspective, such a development
appears politically infeasible both in the NAFTA and FTAA context.
The gradual building-up of hemispheric institutions may pave the way
for the establishment of such institutions. In the long term, collective
decision-making may appear both desirable and politically feasible.
89 See, e.g., MONETARY COMMITrEE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, THE IN-
SRUmENTS OF MONETARY POuCY IN THE COuNTIrS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITy (1962), and MONETARY COMMrITEE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MONETARY
PoucY IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1972).
90 The difficulties inherent in establishing and defending rate pegs were alluded to by Robert
Hormats, speech to the Commerce DepartmentlGW Conference on the GATr Uruguay Round,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 23, 1995. Hormats recommended increased transparency and efforts to
strengthen international arrangements under the IMF and Group of Seven.
91 Of course, adequate protection of confidential information would be required.
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C. Conclusions
The nations of the western hemisphere have agreed to complete
negotiation of an FTAA by 2005, and to make concrete progress to-
ward the attainment of that objective by the year 2000. The drafting of
an FTAA legal text is important, as are decisions concerning the vari-
ous components of its institutional structure. Nevertheless, the key to
the success or failure of the FTAA enterprise is likely to be a political
one. At the end of the negotiating process, will there be sufficient
political support in the capitols of the member nations to bring the
agreement into force?
Today this question cannot be answered with any assurance. It
seems clear, however, that if there is to be adequate political support
for the FTAA, the interests of key actors and groups throughout the
region will need to be satisfactorily addressed. No one actor or group
will have all of its interests satisfied. Ultimately, achieving a successful
outcome will require striking the appropriate balance among parties
whose interests both converge and conffict.
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